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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN AN ERA OF 
CONSOLIDATED POWER* 
CARLEEN M. ZUBRZYCKI** 
Punitive damages are back in the news, and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
surrounding them is a mess. The Court’s decisions do, however, reveal one 
striking and unifying theme: the Court does not trust others to assess punitive 
damages fairly. Instead, at every turn, the Court has adopted rules that move 
the locus of power over punitive damages away from juries, factfinders, states, 
and communities, and toward appellate judges (including the Court itself). The 
result is that the amounts of punitive damages—historically, firmly within the 
power of juries—are now subject to an unprecedented level of centralized 
control, a phenomenon I call judicial centralization. This Article traces the 
rather remarkable narrative of the Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence 
through the lens of judicial centralization and considers whether it is desirable, 
concluding that it is not. The primary justifications for judicial centralization 
are uniformity and predictability, but the flip sides—particularity and 
variability—serve similarly important functions. Institutional competence also 
does not provide a compelling explanation, as both judges and juries have real 
claims to the type of moral expertise that punitive damages implicate. 
Ultimately, the deciding factor in this inquiry is democratic values. In an age 
where power is increasingly consolidated in large corporations and the ability of 
the “little guy” to affect the world is ever-diminishing, punitive damages can 
serve as an important opportunity for voice, and judicial centralization 
undermines this important value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on punitive damages—developed 
almost entirely over the course of the last three decades—is a conceptual mess. 
Commentators have spent the greater part of those decades critiquing the 
Court’s approach1 or attempting to construct theoretical models that could 
 
 1. See, e.g., Anthony Sebok, Normative Theories of Punitive Damages: The Case of Deterrence, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF THE LAW OF TORTS 317 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) [hereinafter 
Sebok, Normative Theories] (noting that the Court’s “theory of common law punitive damages leaves 
many questions unanswered”); Steve P. Calandrillo, Penalizing Punitive Damages: Why the Supreme Court 
Needs a Lesson in Law and Economics, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 777 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s 
varied efforts to limit arbitrary punitive damages awards “has been completely arbitrary in its own 
right”); Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the Court That Would Be King of 
Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV. 461, 464 (2005) (characterizing the Court’s approach to punitive 
damages as “judicial miniaturism because of its myopic focus on one-on-one torts,” thereby preventing 
states from responding to corporate wrongdoing); Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to 
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provide coherent conceptual support for different portions of the Court’s 
jurisprudence2 with varying degrees of success. Essentially no one, however, 
defends the body of jurisprudence on its own terms. 
The Court’s lack of clarity mirrors the deep disagreement in the academic 
literature about what purposes punitive damages may legitimately serve in our 
tort system.3 While the Court has long explained that punitive damages are 
 
Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1029 (2007) [hereinafter Sebok, Myth to Theory] (arguing, among other 
things, that the ratio component of the Court’s due process jurisprudence “lacks any principled 
foundation, and does not even have the virtue of being an arbitrary rule chosen by the legislature”); 
Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon: A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 25, 26 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation] (arguing that the Court 
has unduly elevated a retributive understanding of the purposes of punitive damages); Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1772 (2012) [hereinafter 
Zipursky, Palsgraf] (characterizing the Court’s punitive damages due process jurisprudence as “[a]n 
[a]rc of [i]ncoherence”). 
 2. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby, Clearing the Smoke from Philip Morris v. Williams: The Past, 
Present, and Future of Punitive Damages, 118 YALE L.J. 392, 394 (2008) (seeking to “provide the 
theoretical defense of the Court’s holding [that punitive damages cannot be used to punish wrongdoers 
for injuries to nonparties] that is missing from its own opinion”); Sebok, Myth to Theory, supra note 1, 
at 1032 (providing a framework of punitive damages as personal revenge and noting, for instance, that 
it offers a justification for the Court’s rule prohibiting punishment for harms to nonparties); Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 350–52 (2003) [hereinafter 
Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages] (arguing that the Court’s decision in State Farm 
“[p]erhaps unwittingly” legitimated a non-punitive rationale for punitive damages, which Sharkey 
articulates as “societal damages”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 105, 130 (2005) [hereinafter Zipursky, Theory of Punitive Damages] (offering the theory that 
punitive damages have a “double aspect”—one relating to the state’s interests and one relating to 
individual victims’ interests—and that, once this dual aspect is disentangled, it suggests that the seminal 
case BMW v. Gore was rightly decided—but noting that “the Court is not explicit” about this theory 
“and indeed, expressly says it is doing something different”). 
 3. The approaches to punitive damages generally track broader theoretical approaches to tort 
law. At the risk of dramatically simplifying a rich area, these generally fall into three categories. First, 
under the law and economics view, damages aim to force actors to internalize the costs of their behavior, 
and punitive damages are no exception. See, e.g., Calandrillo, supra note 1, at 779 (“The ultimate goal 
of modern tort law jurisprudence should be to make injurers internalize the full costs of all of their 
actions so that they will take the proper level of care—not too much, not too little, but just right.”). 
Under this view, punitive damages must be imposed “for deterrence purposes” whenever a tortfeasor 
has escaped liability previously, regardless of whether his conduct was intentional or egregious; on the 
other hand, imposing punitive damages for conduct that gives rise to little concrete harm simply 
because it is morally reprehensible risks “overdeterrence,” leading to an overall reduction in social 
welfare. Id. Second, along similar lines, Professors A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have 
argued that punitive damages should be calculated by simply multiplying the harm caused by a tort by 
the likelihood of its underdetection. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 889 (1998). Others within a law and economics framework 
have built out more novel economic justifications for punitive damages, generally by broadening the 
scope of harms that should be incorporated into the calculus. Finally, and perhaps most notably, 
Professor Catherine Sharkey has argued that punitive damages should be reconceptualized as “societal 
damages”—essentially, damages meant to compensate society for the harms that the defendant’s 
conduct imposed on those beyond the plaintiff, which might otherwise not be properly accounted for 
in potential tortfeasors’ cost-benefit analyses. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 
2, at 2. 
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meant to “punish and deter,”4 the questions of what that means and whether 
those are appropriate aims for private litigation are the subject of an enormous 
body of literature.5 While the jurisprudential underpinnings are murky, from 
ten thousand feet, one defining strand of unity emerges: a move towards 
centralization.6 In multiple intertwined doctrinal areas, the Court’s punitive 
 
Others view tort law as source of corrective justice, with the aim of creating a system of duties 
and responsibilities that are incurred when those duties are violated or, more broadly, to promote moral 
repair. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 384–85 (1992) (“To understand tort law is to 
see it in part as a web of substantive and structural rules designed to enforce claims in corrective 
justice.”). Some corrective justice theories of tort law try to incorporate punitive damages by suggesting 
that they allow for plaintiffs to be compensated for nonmonetary losses that are not otherwise 
incorporated into compensatory damages. For instance, Jeffrey Berryman has argued that punitive 
damages compensate plaintiffs for dignitary harms. See Jeffrey Berryman, Reconceptualizing Aggravated 
Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential Loss, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521, 1542 (2004). 
A third closely related body of scholarship developed over the last few decades asserts that the 
purpose of tort law generally is to create a system of civil redress that allows victims to pursue justice 
against those who have harmed them. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 712–13, 749 (2003) [hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; Benjamin C. Zipursky, 
Rights, Wrongs and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, 
Rights, Wrongs and Recourse]. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due 
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) [hereinafter Goldberg, 
Constitutional Status] (arguing that tort law, properly conceived as a system of redress for private 
wrongs, is a foundational part of the structure of American government with constitutional status). 
Under this conception, the basic purpose of punitive damages can be understood, roughly, as allowing 
victims of wrongs recognized by the state to seek a form of private retribution from the person or entity 
that wronged them that corresponds more to the egregiousness of the wrong than to the plaintiff’s 
actual injury. Professor Markel offered a twist on this basic idea by proposing the “confrontational 
conception of retributivism,” which emphasizes society’s interest in retribution while also prioritizing 
the minimization of different types of error and variation in punishment. Dan Markel, Retributive 
Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 239, 257–59 
(2009). More recently, in a similar spirit, Professor Hershovitz offered a theory of punitive damages 
as a substitute for revenge and contends that this substitute can operate as a form of corrective justice. 
See Scott Hershovitz, Tort as a Substitute for Revenge, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS 87–88 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014). For a particularly enjoyable and timely discussion of what 
wrongs committed by robots might tell us about the role of concepts like “revenge” and “retribution,” 
see generally Christina Mulligan, Revenge Against Robots, 69 S.C. L. REV. 579 (2018) (arguing that 
retribution asks what the wrongdoer deserves but revenge focuses on the personal desire of the 
wrongdoer’s victim). 
Finally, and most recently, Professor Tilley has offered a “New Doctrinal” account of tort law as 
a tool for the creation of communities. See Cristina Carmody Tilley, Tort Law Inside out, 126 YALE L.J. 
1320, 1324 (2017). Under this approach, punitive damages may serve as a mechanism for stigmatization, 
and the appropriate role and processes for those damages likely depends upon the nature of the 
community relationships at stake in any given case. Id. at 1398. 
 4. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II), 549 U.S. 346, 352 (2007) 
(“[P]unitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing 
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 
107 (1893) (“The recovery of damages, beyond compensation for the injury received, by way of 
punishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from offending in like manner, is here clearly 
recognized.”). 
 5. See supra note 3. 
 6. See infra Part I. 
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damages decisions have shifted the locus of control over large punitive damages 
awards away from dispersed, ground-level actors—like juries, trial judges, and 
even state courts and legislatures—toward a narrower group of appellate judges, 
including the Court itself. 
The question this Article takes up is whether this judicial centralization is 
for the better. The time for this consideration is ripe. While the Roberts Court 
has demonstrated a (welcome) reluctance to wade into the morass of punitive 
damages law, punitive damages awards have not faded from public importance. 
In December 2018, Johnson & Johnson lost its bid to have a trial judge overturn 
what will, if affirmed, be one of the largest punitive damages awards in history: 
a $4.7 billion award imposed by a jury upon finding that Johnson & Johnson 
knew for decades that its baby powder contained asbestos.7 An appeal is, 
undoubtedly, forthcoming.8 A few years ago, in a case alleging a pharmaceutical 
company’s twelve-year campaign to hide a drug’s cancer risks, a federal trial 
judge felt compelled by the Supreme Court’s recent due process jurisprudence 
to reduce a jury award of $9 billion to $37 million—a swing of $8.6 billion.9 
And the question of punitive damages looms in the background of other major 
litigations, including the surge of lawsuits seeking to pin responsibility for the 
opioid crisis on pharmaceutical companies, pharmacies, executives, doctors, and 
others who allegedly knowingly misled the public or promoted the misuse of 
opioids.10 The shift in power over punitive damages up the chain and towards 
the Supreme Court has enormous practical impact, and the question of whether 
any benefit from this centralization is worth its costs is urgently important. This 
Article seeks to address that question and also to consider what the case study 
of punitive damages indicates about larger trends in the federal courts. 
Toward that end, this Article begins in Part I by reconstructing the Court’s 
punitive damages case law in some depth because appreciating this judicial 
centralization requires a holistic view of the “forest” of the Court’s 
jurisprudence in this area. That forest, in turn, is made up of the rather 
 
 7. Tiffany Hsu, Johnson & Johnson Loses Bid To Overturn a $4.7 Billion Baby Powder Verdict, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/19/business/johnson-johnson-baby-
powder-verdict.html [https://perma.cc/C2RV-9VN4 (dark archive)]. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Jessica Dye, U.S. Judge Slashes $9 Billion Award vs. Takeda, Lilly over Diabetes Drug, REUTERS 
(Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-takeda-pharma-actos-ruling/u-s-judge-slashes-9-
billion-award-vs-takeda-lilly-over-diabetes-drug-idUSKBN0IG26N20141028 
[https://perma.cc/R2N9-WY99]. 
 10. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Purdue Pharma, Inc., No. 1883-CV-01808-BLS2, 2019 WL 
939120 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019) (plaintiff suing Purdue Pharma for its role in contributing to 
the opioid crisis). There are more than two hundred lawsuits involving more than four hundred plaintiff 
cities, states, and other entities that have been consolidated into one multi-district litigation. In re Nat’l 
Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017). While settlement in some or all of 
these cases is likely, the settlement negotiations are necessarily conducted against the backdrop risks of 
punitive damages awards that are, themselves, a product of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
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extraordinary cases in which juries have issued punitive damages awards so 
extreme as to grab the Court’s limited attention. Part II assesses judicial 
centralization on its merits. On the one hand, centralization lends greater 
uniformity and predictability to awards. On the other hand, it diminishes 
variability and particularity, which also have virtues. Because no answer 
emerges in the abstract, Part III takes a step back and explores how judicial 
centralization intersects with broader phenomena. In an era of increased 
consolidation of power and social stratification in a wide range of areas, 
individuals’ and communities’ opportunities for “voice” are ever-decreasing, 
and local participation in the larger forces shaping the world is a diminishing 
but important value. On this dimension, there should be serious concerns about 
judicial centralization as a tool historically used to hold the powerful to account 
for their treatment of the “little guy.” 
I.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
A. The Early Years: Punitive Damage from the Founding to 1978 
Punitive damages in the American tradition11 have their roots in two 
eighteenth-century English cases, Wilkes v. Wood12 and Huckle v. Money,13 in 
which juries issued awards to punish egregious misconduct far in excess of the 
actual damages suffered by the plaintiffs.14 Those cases were widely discussed 
 
 11. On a grander view of history, punitive damages date back far longer—others have discussed 
their roots in everything from Hammurabi’s Code to the Torah. See, e.g., Elliot Klayman & Seth 
Klayman, Punitive Damages: Toward Torah-Based Tort Reform, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 221, 226 (2001) 
(noting that the Torah “has been called ‘the harbinger of modern punitive damages’” (quoting Melvin 
M. Belli, Sr., Punitive Damages: Their History, Their Use and Their Worth in Present-Day Society, 49 
UMKC L. REV. 1, 2 (1980))); see also, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491 (2008) 
(citing the Code of Hammurabi). 
 12. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489; Lofft 2. 
 13. (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768; 2 Wils. K.B. 206. 
 14. Huckle, 95 Eng. Rep. at 769; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 498; see also Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co. 
v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 106 (1893) (describing Wilkes as “[t]he most distinct suggestion of the doctrine 
of exemplary or punitive damages in England before the American Revolution”). The Wilkes case arose 
in 1762 when British politician John Wilkes published a pamphlet that allegedly slandered the King. 
Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493–94. In response, the King’s ministers ransacked Wilkes’s home pursuant 
to a general warrant. Id. at 489. Although Wilkes’s actual compensable damages from the invasion were 
limited, the court imposed a massive damages award of £4000, justifying this award for “more than the 
injury received” on the basis that “[d]amages are designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured 
person, but likewise as a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the future, 
and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action itself.” Id. at 498–99. In Huckle, a jury similarly 
imposed a substantial damage award to punish the abusive use of a general warrant. Huckle, 95 Eng. 
Rep. at 768–69. The English court affirmed that use of “exemplary damages,” explaining that the jury 
had properly issued the larger award given the egregiousness of the defendant’s behavior, 
notwithstanding the “small injury done to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station and 
rank in life.” Id. 
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in American political circles at the time of the Founding.15 By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Court recognized that it was a “well-established 
principle of the common law” that in “all actions on the case for torts, a jury 
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a 
defendant”—damages measured based on “the enormity of [the] offence rather 
than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.”16 In practice, punitive 
damages in early American cases served a number of different purposes, ranging 
from compensating plaintiffs for intangible injuries to punishing defendants in 
order to deter similar conduct in the future.17 
It was taken as a given that the assessment of these damages would 
generally be up to the jury.18 As the Supreme Court explained in 1851: 
 
 15. In addition to its role in establishing punitive damages in the Anglo-American tradition, the 
Wilkes case is foundational in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, serving as a paradigmatic example of 
the abuses that general warrants can give rise to. Many scholars understand the Fourth Amendment to 
have been drafted with the primary goal of enshrining the principle that such warrants are unlawful. 
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–68 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (documenting many 
authorities that stand for the proposition that general warrants were the Fourth Amendment’s specific 
target during the Founding Era); Scott Sundby, Protecting the Citizen “Whilst He Is Quiet”: Suspicionless 
Searches, “Special Needs” and General Warrants, 74 MISS. L.J. 501, 509 (2004) (suggesting that the 
“concern over general warrants . . . suppl[ies] a theoretical and historical underpinning” for Fourth 
Amendment law). This history is suggestive of a prominent feature of current punitive damages 
jurisprudence, which is that even today, large punitive awards are often awarded in cases involving the 
abuse of power by large, wealthy entities against individuals. The Supreme Court acknowledged a 
similar point as far back as 1893, when it explained that “[i]f a public corporation, like an individual, 
acts oppressively, wantonly, abuses power, and a citizen in that way is injured, the citizen, in addition 
to strict compensation, may have, the law says, something in the way of smart money; something as 
punishment for the oppressive use of power.” Prentice, 147 U.S. at 104. 
 16. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851). 
 17. See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History 
of Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 163, 197 (2003) [hereinafter Sebok, What 
Did Punitive Damages Do?] (reviewing early cases and explaining that the cases “can be placed into six 
categories: (1) compensation for emotional suffering; (2) compensation for insult; (3) personal 
vindication; (4) vindication of the state; (5) punishment to set an example; and (6) punishment to 
deter”); see also John C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair vs. Full Compensation, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 444 (2006) (explaining that broad damage awards were not categorized as 
“punitive” or “compensatory” but were rather understood as the redress to which a claimant was 
entitled to by virtue of having been subject to egregious mistreatment); id. at 445–47 (explaining that 
even nominally compensatory awards were understood to depend in part on the nature of the 
misconduct, not just the plaintiff’s harm). Over time, state court judges took steps to render awards 
more rational and predictable, and tort awards were increasingly bifurcated into compensatory and 
punitive elements. Id. at 453–55 (tracing history). One way to understand the Court’s more recent 
jurisprudence outlined in this Article is as a further dramatic step in this process of rationalizing and 
containing damage awards. 
 18. See, e.g., Day, 54 U.S. at 371. In Prentice, a train conductor allegedly intentionally had a doctor 
onboard arrested, without cause, in a particularly humiliating manner, and the jury instructions were 
as follows:  
And, further, after agreeing upon [compensatory damages], you may add something by way 
of punitive damages against the defendant, which is sometimes called smart money, if you are 
satisfied that the conductor’s conduct was illegal, (and it was illegal), wanton, and oppressive. 
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In actions of trespass, where the injury has been wanton and malicious, 
or gross and outrageous, courts permit juries to add to the measured 
compensation of the plaintiff which he would have been entitled to 
recover, had the injury been inflicted without design or intention, 
something farther by way of punishment or example, which has 
sometimes been called “smart money.” This has been always left to the 
discretion of the jury, as the degree of punishment to be thus inflicted 
must depend on the peculiar circumstances of each case.19 
Because punitive damages were issued in the context of common law 
actions arising under state law, the Court rarely had occasion to opine on them 
directly during the first two hundred years of the Republic.20  
In the early twentieth century, Lochner v. New York21 ushered in the era of 
economic substantive due process jurisprudence, during which the Court struck 
down numerous laws and regulations on the theory that the Constitution’s Due 
Process Clause enshrines a substantive right to be free of economic restrictions 
and penalties in a variety of contexts.22 The longstanding common law tradition 
of punitive damages, however, remained essentially untouched even during the 
Lochner era.23 Indeed, in its only due process challenge to punitive damages, the 
Court concluded that corporations lacked a substantive due process right to be 
free of respondeat superior liability for punitive damages.24 
B. Centralizing Punitive Damages: A Story in Three (or Maybe Four) Parts 
Beginning in the 1980s, there was an increasing groundswell of public 
criticism over punitive damages awards, which were considered “out of 
 
How much that shall be the court cannot tell you. You must act as reasonable men, and not 
indulge vindictive feelings towards the defendant. 
Prentice, 147 U.S. at 103–04. 
 19. Day, 54 U.S. at 371. Along the same lines, another nineteenth-century case described the 
imposition of punitive damages in some cases as “[t]he right of the jury.” Denver & Rio Grand Ry. 
Co. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609 (1887) (“The right of the jury in some cases to award exemplary or 
punitive damages is no longer an open question in this court.”). 
 20. The Court has had occasion to address various questions surrounding availability of punitive 
damages in various federal statutory schemes. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 
U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that municipalities could not be subject to punitive damages under 28 
U.S.C. § 1983); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 52 (1979) (addressing availability 
of punitive damages under the Railway Labor Act). 
 21. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 22. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and 
the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 758 (2009). 
 23. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 504 n.305 (identifying cases in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century where a few plaintiffs successfully argued that the imposition of 
punitive damages after a criminal conviction for the same underlying conduct violated the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy). 
 24. See Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 115 (1927). 
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control.”25 The empirical accuracy of this characterization was, to say the least, 
doubtful.26 But the Supreme Court took note,27 and in the ensuing decades 
developed a number of doctrinal threads that enabled it to solve this perceived 
problem. The overall effect was to vest an unprecedented level of substantive 
control over punitive damages in the Court itself, and the federal courts of 
appeals, at the particular expense of juries and trial judges. 
1.  Centralized Substantive Rules: The Supreme Court’s Creation of Rules 
Limiting the Quantity and Purposes of Punitive Damages 
a. The Lead-Up 
Before 1989, the Supreme Court had never so much as suggested that the 
Constitution had anything to say about the size of punitive damages awards 
issued by juries in state courts. Yet by 1996, when the Court for the first time 
struck down a punitive damages award as substantively excessive in the 
landmark case BMW v. Gore,28 it was hardly a surprise. In the intervening seven 
years from 1989 to 1996, the Court repeatedly considered substantive challenges 
to punitive damages awards, and Gore was the logical extension of the Court’s 
reasoning in those decisions.29 Given the discretionary nature of the Court’s 
 
 25. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (1990) (describing the politicization of the punitive damages discussion as the result of 
“an intense, well-organized, and well-financed political campaign by interest groups seeking 
fundamental reforms in the civil justice system benefiting themselves”); Sebok, Myth to Theory, supra 
note 1, at 962 (noting that the idea that punitive damages are out of control has been a “recurring theme 
in the literature” since 1985); Catherine M. Sharkey, Federal Incursions and State Defiance: Punitive 
Damages in the Wake of Philip Morris v. Williams, WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 453–63 (2010) 
[hereinafter Sharkey, Federal Incursions]. 
 26. A significant body of research suggests that the punitive damages “crisis” was a fiction. See, 
e.g., Rustad, supra note 1, at 462 n.6 (“Despite the diversity in research methods and samples, research 
studies of the law in action agree that there is no punitive damages crisis.”); Sebok, Myth to Theory, 
supra note 1, at 962–76 (debunking the “myth” that overall punitive damages awards had recently 
changed in frequency or amount). 
 27. Consistent with—and, at times, perhaps driving—this trend, lawyers representing major 
businesses began filing “scores of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court” urging the Court to impose 
new restrictions on punitive damages. Michael L. Rustad, Happy No More: Federalism Derailed by the 
Court that Would Be King of Punitive Damages, 64 MD. L. REV 461, 462 (2005). For a discussion of the 
role of industry groups’ persistent lobbying of the Court in this area, see Michael Rustad & Thomas 
Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 
91, 95–99 (1993). 
 28. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 29. See id. at 572 (stating that the decision of the Court follows from the principles discussed in 
previous cases). A devoted group of industry lawyers, led by Ted Olson, brought a number of cases 
involving punitive damages earlier in the 1980s, some of which also ultimately provided hints that the 
justices were concerned about the constitutionality of punitive damages. See Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 71 (1988) (declining to address arguments that the punitive damages 
award violated Eighth Amendment or due process principles because those arguments were not 
properly preserved); id. at 86–89 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (expressing concern that lack of standards 
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docket, the sheer concentration of punitive cases the court considered makes 
clear that the Court was newly concerned about punitive damages.30 
The Court’s 1989 decision in Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco 
Disposal, Inc.31 was the first harbinger.32 In that case, the Supreme Court rejected 
the defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to a punitive damages award and 
declined to reach any due process question for procedural reasons.33 In a 
concurrence, however, Justices Brennan and Marshall essentially invited the 
defense bar to bring cases raising due process challenges to punitive damages 
awards, joining the majority “on the understanding that it leaves the door open 
for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive 
damages in civil cases brought by private parties.”34 
Unsurprisingly, the defense bar took Justices Brennan and Marshall’s 
invitation to heart. Two terms later, the Court granted certiorari in Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,35 which properly presented a due process 
challenge.36 While the Court ultimately upheld the $1 million punitive damages 
award in that case, it stated that the award might be “close to the line” of 
constitutional excessiveness—suggesting, for the first time, that there was a 
substantive line that might, in some other case, be crossed.37 
In 1993, the Court made explicit what had been left implicit in Haslip: the 
Due Process Clause was the source of a substantive right to be free from 
excessive punitive damages awards, regardless of the procedures used to impose 
them. In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,38 a jury entered an 
award consisting of $19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in 
punitive damages against an oil company that had brought frivolous lawsuits 
 
to guide juries may violate procedural due process principles and stating that the issue would warrant 
the Court’s attention in an “appropriate case”); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828–29 
(1986) (finding it unnecessary to reach arguments that punitive damages awards might violate the 
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment or procedural due process principles, but noting that 
those arguments involved “important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved”). 
 30. For background on the rareness, and corresponding salience, of certiorari grants, see Jeffrey 
S. Sutton & Brittany Jones, The Certiorari Process and State Court Decisions, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 167, 
169 (2018). 
 31. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
 32. Id. at 280. 
 33. Id. at 274–77. 
 34. Id. at 280–82 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 35. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
 36. See id. at 9–10. 
 37. Id. at 20. The substantive implication of this holding was only underscored by Justice 
O’Connor’s forceful dissent, in which she argued that the trial processes (including vague jury 
instructions) did not meet the requirements of procedural due process and that there was no need for 
the Court to invoke substantive due process principles. Id. at 46 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In Justice 
O’Connor’s view, the jury instructions—which gave the jury nearly unfettered discretion to award 
punitive damages—were so unclear as to be void for vagueness. See id. (“The vagueness question is not 
even close.”). 
 38. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
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and pursued other fraudulent actions in order to reduce the payments the oil 
company would be required to make under an oil and gas lease and had engaged 
in “similar nefarious activities” in other business dealings.39 The Court 
ultimately affirmed the punitive damages award—but the plurality stressed that 
a defendant’s due process rights could be violated by an excessively large 
punitive damages award regardless of whether there were any procedural 
defects underlying the award.40 The plurality declined, however, to adopt a test 
or otherwise provide guidance regarding when that threshold might be crossed, 
instead explaining only that “[a] general concer[n] of reasonableness . . . 
properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus.”41 In the case before it, the 
Court simply accounted for factors, including “the amount of money potentially 
at stake [with respect to the oil contract], the bad faith of petitioner, the fact 
that the scheme employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, 
trickery and deceit, and petitioner’s wealth,” and concluded that taken together 
those factors indicated that the award was not “so ‘grossly excessive’ as to be 
beyond the power of the State to allow.”42 
b. BMW v. Gore: A New Substantive Due Process Right 
In 1996, the Supreme Court reached its breaking point in the landmark 
case of BMW of North America, Inc., v. Gore.43 The Court for the first time 
invalidated a punitive damages award on substantive due process grounds.44 At 
first glance, the facts of the case look tailor-made for an excessiveness challenge: 
in contrast to the many punitive damages cases brought by sympathetic, often 
injured, victims, in this case, the plaintiff was a doctor who brought suit against 
BMW for a poor paint job on a perfectly functional luxury car.45 The plaintiff, 
Dr. Ira Gore, purchased a new BMW for roughly $40,000, and upon taking the 
car in to repaint it, he discovered that the car’s paint had been damaged and 
recoated by BMW prior to purchasing it.46 Although BMW maintained it was 
 
 39. Id. at 450–51 (plurality opinion). 
 40. In reaching that conclusion, the plurality relied primarily on the Court’s year-old precedent 
in Haslip and a number of Lochner-era precedents invalidating state-imposed fines and penalties. Id. at 
453–54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)). The Lochner-era cases 
on which the Court relied involved challenges to state-imposed penalties, rather than to awards of 
punitive damages in private tort suits. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 
(1907)(concluding that the state law imposing a $50 fine on common carriers who failed to timely pay 
claims for loss or damages was constitutional, but suggesting that there might be constitutional 
limitations on states’ ability to impose larger fines); St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 
63, 66–67 (1919) (noting that it has been “fully recognized” that the Due Process Clause limits states’ 
abilities to prescribe penalties for violations of state law). 
 41. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458. 
 42. Id. at 462. 
 43. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
 44. Id. at 559. 
 45. Id. at 563, 576. 
 46. Id. at 563. 
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unaware that the value of the car had diminished as a result of the repainting, 
Gore presented expert testimony suggesting that the car’s resale value was 
reduced by as much as ten percent.47 The jury awarded Gore $4000 in 
compensatory damages.48 But, upon finding that BMW’s policy (under which 
it did not disclose presale repairs amounting to less than three percent of a car’s 
value) constituted “gross, oppressive, or malicious” fraud, the jury imposed a 
punitive damages award of $4 million.49 The case made its way to the Alabama 
Supreme Court, which reduced the award to $2 million on the basis that the 
jury appeared to have improperly sought to punish out-of-state conduct.50 The 
Court ultimately granted certiorari on the question of whether the punitive 
damages award was so large as to violate BMW’s right to due process.51 
In an opinion authored by Justice Stevens, the Court concluded that the 
size of the Alabama jury’s punitive damages award violated BMW’s right to due 
process.52 In so ruling, the Court established three “guideposts” for ascertaining 
whether an award is constitutionally excessive. The first guidepost, and 
“perhaps most important,” is the reprehensibility of the underlying conduct.53 
The second guidepost—and, in the subsequent years, most controversial—is the 
ratio between the punitive damages award and the extent of the harm, or 
potential harm, it caused.54 Although the Court purported to “reject[] the 
notion that the constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula,” 
it explained that, in general, the amount of punitive damages awards should not 
exceed a “10-to-1 ratio” to the amount of any compensatory damages award.55 
The third guidepost is the relationship between the punitive damages award 
and the severity of civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for 
“comparable misconduct.”56 
2.  De Novo Appellate Review of Punitive Damages 
In principle, this change need not result in a dramatic shift in power over 
punitive damages awards. In the ensuing years, however, the approach that the 
Court adopted to implement Gore’s guideposts did just that in a series of 
subsequent cases. 
 
 47. Id. at 564. 
 48. Id. at 565. 
 49. Id. 
 50. At trial, BMW indicated that it had declined to disclose similar presale repairs regarding 
fourteen cars in Alabama, and 983 others across America. See id. at 564. 
 51. Id. at 568. 
 52. Id. at 585–86. 
 53. Id. at 575. 
 54. Id. at 580. 
 55. Id. at 582. 
 56. Id. at 583. 
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a. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc. 
First, in 2001, a divided Court held that the review of trial courts’ 
application of the Gore excessiveness guideposts should be de novo.57 In the 
underlying dispute, a jury concluded that a manufacturer had tried to pass its 
product off as a competitor’s name-brand tool. The jury awarded $50,000 in 
compensatory damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. The district court 
upheld the award under the Gore guideposts, and on appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
applied an abuse-of-discretion standard and affirmed.58 
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the Ninth Circuit should 
have applied a de novo standard of review for largely prudential reasons.59 In 
particular, the majority initially gave three primary reasons for determining 
which standard of review should govern the reasonable suspicion/probable cause 
inquiry in the Fourth Amendment context: (1) reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause “cannot be articulated with precision,” but are instead “fluid 
concepts” that must be defined in context; (2) the legal rules “acquire content 
only through application,” and de novo review is “therefore necessary if 
appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify, the legal principles”; 
and (3) “de novo review tends to unify precedent” and “stabilize the law.”60 
Explaining that these three features also apply to the Gore excessiveness 
standard, the Court concluded with little further analysis that de novo review 
applied.61 
Notably missing from the majority’s discussion was whether any of these 
three features—precisely defined standards, appellate control, or unified 
precedent—are useful or important in the context of punitive damages. In a few 
stray lines addressing Seventh Amendment concerns, the Court breezily 
explained that “[d]ifferences in the institutional competence of trial judges and 
appellate judges are consistent with” de novo review.62 It recognized that 
district courts might “have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals” 
with respect to reprehensibility (the “most important” Gore guidepost), that the 
second guidepost (the ratio between the compensatory damages and punitive 
damages) could be assessed equally well by trial and appellate courts, and that 
the third guidepost (a broad comparison of penalties for similar violations) is 
more suited to appellate review.63 The Court stopped short of asserting that 
 
 57. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001) (“[C]ourts of 
appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when passing on district courts’ determinations of 
the constitutionality of punitive damages awards.”). 
 58. Id. at 426. 
 59. Id. at 436. 
 60. Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 697–98 (1996)). 
 61. Id. at 436. 
 62. Id. at 440, 449. 
 63. Id. at 440. 
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institutional competencies actually support de novo review; instead, it 
concluded that they “fail to tip the balance in favor of deferential appellate 
review.”64 Having reached this conclusion, the Court remanded to the Ninth 
Circuit to apply the proper standard, but not before detailing a number of 
“questionable conclusions” by the district court judge that “may not survive de 
novo review.”65 
As Justice Ginsburg’s forceful dissent makes clear, the application of de 
novo review to a factually intensive question of tort damages is especially 
striking in light of the Court’s approach to the standard of review regarding 
purportedly excessive compensatory damages.66 In Gasperini v. Center for 
Humanities, Inc.67—decided the same term as Gore—the Court held that 
“appellate review of a federal trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a jury’s 
verdict as excessive” was reconcilable with the Seventh Amendment if the 
standard of review was “abuse of discretion,” while strongly suggesting that a 
more robust standard of review would pose a constitutional problem.68 The 
Court held that “practical reasons combine with Seventh Amendment 
constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of appeals, primary 
responsibility for application of an excessiveness standard,” and that 
emphasized the importance of trial judges’ “unique opportunity to consider the 
evidence in the living courtroom context.”69 As Justice Ginsburg stressed in her 
Cooper dissent, it is not obvious that Gasperini’s logic should not apply equally 
to allegations that punitive damages are excessive, as both compensatory 
damages and punitive damages involve intangible and difficult-to-quantify 
concepts (like the dollar value of “pain and suffering”), and both are 
fundamentally dependent on determinations that are understood as fact-
finding, like the extent of harm or potential harm caused, and the defendant’s 
good faith and mens rea.70 
In closing, Justice Ginsburg stressed that even the majority agreed that 
district courts are better positioned to consider the most important Gore factor 
(reprehensibility), and that “in the typical case envisioned by Gore,” appellate 
 
 64. Id. at 440. 
 65. Id. at 441, 443. 
 66. Id. at 445–46 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Additionally, Justice Thomas concurred in the 
judgment but wrote separately to stress that, given the opportunity, he would overrule Gore’s 
substantive guideposts. Id. at 443 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Scalia also concurred, writing 
separately to indicate that he continued to disagree with Gore and generally believed that the Court 
should apply a deferential standard of review to fact-bound constitutional questions. Id. at 443–44 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Given the state of the Court’s precedents, however, he concurred in the 
judgment. See id. at 444. 
 67. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 68. Id. at 434, 428–39. 
 69. Id. at 438. 
 70. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 446 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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courts thus “should have infrequent occasion to reverse.”71 Thus, she predicted, 
so long as lower courts carefully separate out fact-findings that qualify for 
clearly erroneous review, the practical difference between the Court’s approach 
and her own “is not large.”72 
b. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell: De Novo 
Review in Practice 
Time quickly proved Justice Ginsburg’s (perhaps hortatory) prediction 
wrong. In 2003, the Court had an opportunity to demonstrate what its new de 
novo review would look like in practice. It did so in State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell (Campbell II)73 where a major corporation abused its 
power against elderly, vulnerable customers in a context rather far removed 
from the car-paint damage at issue in Gore.74 
In the underlying incident, Curtis Campbell, an elderly man suffering 
from a recent stroke and early-stage Parkinson’s disease, attempted to pass a 
truck on a two-lane road, forcing an oncoming vehicle to swerve onto the 
shoulder to avoid him.75 The driver of the oncoming vehicle was killed and 
another was permanently disabled.76 Insurance experts and State Farm’s 
investigators agreed early on that Mr. Campbell was at fault.77 Notwithstanding 
that clarity, in ensuing tort suits brought by the estate of the deceased driver 
and by the disabled passenger, State Farm refused offers to settle for a mere 
$50,000—Mr. Campbell’s policy limit—even though it assured Mr. Campbell 
and his wife that the company was representing their interests, that their assets 
were not at risk, and that they should not obtain their own counsel.78 
Subsequently, and unsurprisingly, a jury concluded that Mr. Campbell was one-
hundred percent responsible for the crash and returned a judgment of $185,849 
against him.79 State Farm refused to cover the $135,849 that exceeded Mr. 
Campbell’s policy limit.80 Instead, State Farm’s counsel told the Campbells to 
put their house up for sale “to get things moving,” and State Farm refused to 
post a bond to allow Mr. Campbell to appeal the judgment.81 The “utterly 
 
 71. Id. at 449. 
 72. Id. at 449–50. 
 73. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
 74. See id. at 412–13. 
 75. Id. at 412, 434. 
 76. Id. at 413. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. The settlement offers for the policy limits were made as late as a month before trial. See 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Campbell I), 65 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Utah 2001). 
 79. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 413. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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dismayed” Campbells obtained other counsel and quickly “learned that their 
situation was indeed grave.”82 
In coordination with the plaintiffs in the tort suit against them, the 
Campbells brought suit against State Farm alleging bad faith.83 Among other 
things, discovery revealed that when State Farm’s analyst concluded that there 
was a high risk of liability if the case went to trial, his manager ordered him to 
change his conclusion, and a second analyst who agreed that liability was likely 
was removed from the case.84 The jury concluded that State Farm had acted 
unreasonably and in bad faith by taking the case to trial.85 
At the penalty phase, State Farm continued to argue that its decision to 
take the case to trial was an “honest mistake.”86 In response, the Campbells 
produced a rather astonishing collection of evidence that State Farm’s decision 
to take the case to trial was part of a national scheme to meet corporate fiscal 
goals by capping payouts on claims company-wide.87 That clinical insurance-
work language—“capping payouts”—obscures just how colorful and malicious 
State Farm’s efforts to deliberately deceive and cheat its customers were. 
Agents “changed the contents of files, lied to customers, and committed other 
dishonest and fraudulent acts”—including, for instance, adding an entirely 
made-up assertion to the case file that the deceased victim of Campbell’s 
accident had been “speeding to visit his pregnant girlfriend.”88 These fraudulent 
practices “were consistently directed to persons—poor racial or ethnic 
minorities, women, and elderly individuals—who State Farm believed would 
be less likely to object or take legal action.”89 Past employees testified that they 
were explicitly trained to target “the weakest of the herd,” that is, “the elderly, 
the poor, and . . . consumers who are least knowledgeable about their rights and 
. . . most vulnerable to trickery or deceit, or who have little money and hence 
have no real alternative but to accept an inadequate offer to settle a claim at 
much less than fair market value.”90 And an expert witness testified that the 
Campbells’ case was a “classic example” of the implementation of this policy.91 
 
 82. Campbell I, 65 P.3d at 1142. 
 83. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 414. 
 84. Campbell I, 65 P.3d at 1141–42. 
 85. Id. at 1142. 
 86. Id. at 1143. 
 87. The Campbells adduced “extensive expert testimony” regarding State Farm’s fraudulent 
practices, and the trial court made “nearly twenty-eight pages of extensive findings concerning State 
Farm’s reprehensible conduct.” Id. at 1147–48. 
 88. Id. at 1148. (“[The victim] was not speeding, nor did he have a pregnant girlfriend. The only 
purpose for the change was to distort the assessment of the value of [the victim’s] claims against State 
Farm’s insured.”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 433 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 433. The trial court’s findings regarding the compensatory damage award here provide 
additional color regarding the Campbells. They were “elderly,” Mr. Campbell was experiencing 
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If that were not enough, State Farm deliberately destroyed all relevant 
documents about the scheme (even while litigation was ongoing); 
“systematically harassed and intimidated opposing claimants and witnesses” (by 
paying a hotel maid, for instance, to disclose whether a witness to the 
Campbells’ case had overnight guests); and expressly instructed its attorneys 
and claim superintendents to use “mad dog defense tactics—using the 
company’s large resources to ‘wear out’ opposing attorneys by prolonging 
litigation, making meritless objections, claiming false privileges, destroying 
documents, and abusing the law and motion process.”92 
The jury awarded the Campbells $2.6 million in compensatory damages 
and $145 million in punitive damages; the trial judge remitted those awards to 
$1 million and $25 million, respectively.93 The Utah Supreme Court ultimately 
reinstated the $145 million punitive damages award.94 It discussed and applied 
the Gore guideposts, heavily emphasizing the egregious and expansive pattern 
of misconduct described by the trial court’s extensive findings.95 The court also 
noted that the trial court had found that corporate headquarters “had never 
learned of—much less acted upon”—a jury verdict amounting to less than $100 
million, and that State Farm’s aggressive and unlawful efforts to conceal its 
wrongdoing, on top of its enormous resources, made it exceedingly unlikely that 
its similar misconduct would be uncovered.96 
The Supreme Court reversed.97 The majority opinion, authored by Justice 
Kennedy, marched through each Gore guidepost. As for “reprehensibility,” the 
Court commented that “State Farm’s handling of the claims against the 
Campbells merits no praise, but a more modest punishment could have satisfied 
the State’s legitimate objectives.”98 The Court further explained that it was 
impermissible for the state courts to consider “unlawful acts committed outside 
 
residuary effects of a stroke and had Parkinson’s disease, had previously suffered financial setbacks, and 
had modest financial resources and no financial reserves. Id. at 434. Mr. Campbell’s past traumas 
included “the murder of his first wife, his second wife’s desertion following his stroke, and the death 
of his third wife from cancer less than two years after their marriage”; additionally, Mrs. Campbell’s 
prior “bitter divorce” and ex-husband’s failure to live up to financial obligations had led to the 
repossession of the Campbells’ car and the placement of their home in foreclosure. Order Re 
Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial or Remittur regarding the Compensatory Damages Awards at *2f–
g, Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 890905231, 1998 WL 35159343 (Utah Dist. Ct. 
Aug. 3, 1998), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part 65 P.3d 1134 (Utah 2001). The trial court elaborated that the 
Campbells were “quiet, unassuming, and trusting individuals” who had “readily entrusted their financial 
and emotional wellbeing to State Farm,” only to have that trust betrayed. Id. at *2h, *2j. 
 92. Campbell I, 65 P.3d. at 1148. 
 93. Id. at 1141. 
 94. Id. at 1155. 
 95. Id. at 1152–55. 
 96. Id. at 1147, 1153 (noting that expert had testified that State Farm’s conduct would come to the 
surface in only one of 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability). 
 97. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 429 (2003). 
 98. Id. at 423. 
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of [its] jurisdiction” and that while a pattern of conduct could be probative of 
State Farm’s culpability, “[d]ue process does not permit courts . . . to adjudicate 
the merits of other parties’ hypothetical claims . . . under the guise of the 
reprehensibility analysis.”99 The Court concluded that “the Campbells have 
shown no conduct by State Farm similar to that which harmed them,” and “the 
only conduct relevant to the reprehensibility analysis” is that which did so.100 
Having effectively thrown out all evidence of the nationwide policy, the 
Court had little difficulty concluding that reprehensibility could not provide 
constitutional justification for the jury award. As for the “ratio” between 
punitive damages and compensatory damages, the Court reiterated its earlier 
statements that there are “no rigid benchmarks”—but in the next breath, the 
Court asserted that “[s]ingle digit multipliers are more likely to comport with 
due process,” and that “when compensatory damages are substantial,” a ratio 
“perhaps only equal to compensatory damages” would represent the outer limits 
for constitutionality.101 Finally, Justice Kennedy considered the third Gore 
guidepost and noted that the award “dwarf[ed]” Utah’s $10,000 maximum civil 
fine for a single instance of fraud.102 The Court then remanded the case to the 
Utah court to set a new award “in the first instance.”103  
In his dissent, Justice Scalia criticized “the punitive damages jurisprudence 
which has sprung forth from BMW v. Gore” as “insusceptible of principled 
application.”104 Justice Ginsburg, in turn, critiqued “the Court’s swift 
conversion” of the guidelines from Gore “into instructions that begin to 
resemble marching orders.”105 
3.  A New Constitutional Prohibition on Jury Control: Honda Motor Corp. v. 
Oberg 
In a related development in 1994—after TXO and Haslip made clear that 
the Court was concerned with the substantive size of punitive damages awards, 
but before the contours of the Gore guideposts were established—the Court 
considered the limits of how much control over punitive damages states can 
permissibly vest in juries. In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,106 the Court considered 
a procedural due process challenge to an amendment to the Oregon 
Constitution that prohibited judicial review of any “fact tried by a jury”—
including, but not limited to, the amount of punitive damages awards—“unless 
 
 99. Id. at 421, 423. 
 100. Id. at 424. 
 101. Id. at 425. 
 102. Id. at 428. 
 103. Id. at 429. 
 104. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. at 439 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 106. 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
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the court [could] affirmatively say there [was] no evidence to support the 
verdict.”107 The Oregon trial court, appellate court, and state supreme court all 
held that the state constitutional provision—which had been on the books since 
1910—was constitutional.108 The Oregon Supreme Court explained that while 
the scope of judicial review was significantly cabined by the award, the 
substantive instructions that Oregon juries were provided to guide their 
assessment of punitive damages were significantly more specific than the 
instructions provided in most states (and in the underlying decisions in Haslip 
and TXO).109 
The Court, however, reversed, holding that the longstanding state 
constitutional provision deprived defendants of due process.110 The Court 
explained that its recent decisions (Haslip and TXO) “recognized that the 
Constitution imposes a substantive limit on the size of punitive damages” and 
suggested that the question for assessing the constitutionality of Oregon’s 
procedures “should focus on Oregon’s departure from traditional procedures.”111 
The Court then reviewed various early British and American common law cases 
allowing for judicial review, and noted that while those cases “emphasized the 
deference ordinarily afforded jury verdict,” they also “recognized that juries 
sometimes awarded damages so high as to require correction.”112 While the 
plaintiff argued that Oregon used various alternative mechanisms, such as clear 
jury instructions, to cabin jury discretion, the Court concluded that these 
mechanisms were insufficient, explaining that “[t]he problem that concern[ed]” 
the Court was “the possibility that a jury [would] not follow those instructions 
and may return a lawless, biased, or arbitrary verdict.”113 
Justice Ginsburg’s vigorous dissent shines a light on what was at stake in 
the case. Among other things, the dissent made clear that Oregon’s punitive 
damages procedures, as a whole, provide significantly more procedural 
protections and detailed guidance to juries than other states’ punitive damages 
schemes under which the Court had declined to reduce awards.114 In short, the 
only real difference between Oregon’s system and other systems is that, in 
Oregon, the entity evaluating the facts was the jury: 
In product liability cases, Oregon guides and limits the factfinder’s 
discretion on the availability and amount of punitive damages. The 
plaintiff must establish entitlement to punitive damages, under specific 
 
 107. Id. at 427 n.5. 
 108. Id. at 418. 
 109. Id. at 418–19. 
 110. Id. at 432. 
 111. Id. at 420, 421; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. All. Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–54 (1993); 
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991). 
 112. Oberg, 512 at 424. 
 113. Id. at 433. 
 114. Id. at 438, 450–51 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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substantive criteria, by clear and convincing evidence. Where the 
factfinder is a jury, its decision is subject to judicial review to this extent: 
The trial court, or an appellate court, may nullify a verdict if reversible 
error occurred during the trial, if the jury was improperly or inadequately 
instructed, or if there is no evidence to support the verdict.115 
Oregon’s laws set out “substantive criteria,” and jurors were provided with 
“precise instructions detailing them.”116 Moreover, the specific instructions that 
Oregon juries were required to follow closely mirrored the post-verdict standards 
judges use in other states where the Court has affirmed jury awards.117 Justice 
Ginsburg stressed that the early history on the question of substantive judicial 
review of punitive damages decisions was far less clear than the majority 
indicated118—the Court has long held that it is a state’s prerogative to increase 
the power of the jury,119 and the majority invoking its recent substantive due 
process jurisprudence was irrelevant to the case at hand.120 Rather, the question 
apparently presented was whether judicial review of the jury award for 
compliance with state substantive law was required. The majority position on 
that point, she concluded, was “extraordinary, for this Court has never held that 
the Due Process Clause requires a State’s courts to police jury fact findings to 
ensure their conformity with state law.”121 
4.  Coda: Further Glosses from the Court’s Most Recent Cases 
Since State Farm, the Court has issued two significant decisions on 
punitive damages, both of which shed light on the Court’s broader trajectory 
towards centralization. 
 
 115. Id. at 436. 
 116. Oregon required that punitive damages, if any, be awarded based on seven substantive 
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(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct; 
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The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct; (f) The financial 
condition of the defendant; and (g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed 
upon the defendant as a result of the misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive 
damage awards to persons in situations similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal 
penalties to which the defendant has been or may be subjected. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(3) (1991), amended by Act of July 19, 1995, ch. 688, § 4, 1995 Or. Laws 2073, 
2074.  
 117. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 443 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 446. 
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 121. Id. at 449. 
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First, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,122 the Court weighed in on the result 
of decades-long litigation arising out of the Exxon-Valdez oil spill.123 The 
evidence presented to the jury indicated that the accident was caused by a drunk 
captain—the only person licensed to navigate the relevant part of the sound—
who left the bridge during a particularly treacherous path, and that Exxon 
officials were well aware that the captain had a long history of alcohol abuse and 
had recently relapsed.124 The result was nearly eleven million gallons of oil 
pouring into the Prince William Sound, and the incident is considered one of 
the most environmentally damaging oil spills in history.125 When the case came 
to the Court after multiple decades of litigation (including two remands to 
account for the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence), a jury had entered a 
compensatory award of $507.5 million and a punitive damages award of $4.5 
billion, which the Ninth Circuit reduced to $2.5 billion.126 
Unlike the cases discussed above, in Exxon Shipping, the Court was serving 
as a “common law court of last review” under its maritime jurisprudence.127 The 
opinion is thus an especially useful window into the Court’s view on punitive 
damages from a policy perspective—freed from the restriction of deciding only 
what the outer bounds of constitutionality permit, the Court took the 
opportunity to opine at length on policy concerns.128 Justice Souter, writing for 
an equally divided court, took the opportunity to offer an extensive overview of 
the history of its punitive damages jurisprudence and the current state of the 
law across the country and around the world.129 He then considered the “audible 
criticism” of punitive damages awards (which had appeared to motivate much 
of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence) but noted that “the most recent studies 
tend to undercut much of it.”130 “The real problem,” he concluded, is “the stark 
unpredictability of punitive awards.”131 After discussing some available 
statistical evidence about punitive damages, he set out the premise for the 
 
 122. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
 123. Id. at 476. 
 124. Id. at 476–78. 
 125. 12 of the Most Devastating Man-Made Ocean Disasters in History, from Exxon Valdez to Deepwater 
Horizon, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/exxon-valdez-spill-
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 126. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 471. 
 127. Id. at 507. 
 128. See, e.g., Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation, supra note 1, at 26–27 (2009) (“Sitting as a 
common law court of last resort—as opposed to its review posture in the due process trilogy cases, 
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identifying its curative aspirations.”). 
 129. See Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497 (contrasting American practice with that of other countries 
and noting that some legal systems decline to enforce foreign punitive judgments). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 499. 
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discussion that followed: “The common sense of justice would surely bar 
penalties that reasonable people would think excessive for the harm caused in 
the circumstances.”132 With “that aim [in mind],” the Court considered available 
approaches to setting limits on punitive damages—one potential “verbal” 
approach to directing juries properly, and two “numerical” approaches.133 
Ultimately, the Court was “skeptical that verbal formulations, superimposed on 
general jury instructions, are the best insurance against unpredictable 
outliers.”134 So, the Court turned to the numbers and ultimately concluded that 
because the median punitive award in the studies at hand bore a 1:1 ratio to 
compensatory damages, a 1:1 ratio was “a fair upper limit” in maritime cases.135 
Notably, the Court adopted this ratio limitation even though it had not 
identified a state court that had adopted an analogous limitation.136 Instead, the 
Court took its cue from state legislative interventions and concluded that it was 
empowered to enact an analogous limitation in the maritime context.137 
Second, in Philip Morris USA v. Williams (Philip Morris II),138 the Court 
created another substantive federal rule for punitive damages.139 The case was 
brought by the widow of a heavy cigarette smoker.140 Without belaboring the 
point, the record was, once again, egregious.141 The Oregon jury issued a 
punitive damages award of $79.5 million.142 The trial judge reduced the award 
to $32 million under the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence.143 The Court of 
Appeals of Oregon reinstated the jury verdict, and the Oregon Supreme Court 
affirmed before the Court reversed in a five-to-four decision authored by Justice 
Breyer.144 Unlike its earlier excessiveness jurisprudence, the Court focused on 
what it characterized as procedural, rather than substantive, due process 
considerations and held that the Due Process Clause prohibits punitive damages 
awards that punish a defendant for injury to “strangers to the litigation,” 
although injury to others could be used to assess the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct.145 The Court emphasized that permitting such punishment 
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 134. Id. at 504. 
 135. Id. at 513. 
 136. See id. at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. 
 138. 594 U.S. 346 (2007). 
 139. Id. at 353–55. 
 140. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Philip Morris I), 127 P.3d 1165, 1167 (Or. 2006). 
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“would add a near standardless dimension to the punitive damages equation,” 
thereby exacerbating the “fundamental due process concerns” implicated in the 
Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence.146 
The four dissenting justices emphasized different concerns but were 
united in their view that the Court had improperly impeded on the Oregon 
court’s proceedings.147 The implicit lack of respect for the state court 
proceedings was apparently not lost on the Oregon Supreme Court, which took 
the opportunity on remand to unanimously reaffirm its own judgment. As 
others have recounted, the Court granted certiorari in Philip Morris to correct 
the Oregon court’s punitive damages award no fewer than three times before 
finally throwing its hands up and dismissing the final grant of certiorari as 
improvidently granted (after hearing argument on the case) in 2009.148 The 
$79.5 million award remained intact. 
✦        ✦        ✦ 
In short, the story of punitive damages through the last thirty years is one 
of increasing judicial centralization. By creating constitutional limits on 
punitive damages, the Court has necessarily federalized those issues,149 and the 
Court’s procedural decisions regarding who gets to decide issues related to 
punitive damages have shifted upward, towards the Court itself. Another way 
to think about this phenomenon is in terms of expertise: the Court has 
increasingly treated punitive damages as an appropriate subject for its own 
expert judgment, and it has implicitly concluded that appellate judges—and, 
especially, themselves—are the appropriate experts on the bounds of fairness in 
this area. This raises an obvious question: Is that a good thing? 
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II.  OUTCOMES, MORAL EXPERTISE, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
Answering that question requires consideration of the virtues and vices of 
judicial centralization. Judicial centralization takes multiple forms in this 
context—it encompasses a shift in power from juries to judges, from trial judges 
to appellate judges, and from states to the federal judiciary. Each shift reflects 
a movement from more widely dispersed and closer-to-the-ground actors to a 
narrower group exerting a form of top-down control. The normative 
implications of centralization apply to these intertwined strands in different 
ways. Still, the overarching phenomenon is striking and important—and worth 
taking into account regardless of whether one agrees with the outcome of each 
individual decision. 
This section begins with a discussion of judicial centralization’s predictable 
effect on the outcomes of punitive damages awards and, in particular, on the 
outcome effects that seem to especially motivate the Supreme Court: 
uniformity and predictability. While uniformity and predictability have virtues, 
they also come with corresponding losses in the values associated with variation 
and more deeply particularized consideration of cases. Next, the section turns 
to the question of institutional competence. In most views, the assessment of 
punitive damages requires not only factual determinations, but also at least 
some element of moral assessment.150 The question of which types of actors are 
best situated to exercise this type of “moral expertise” is complex. On the whole, 
neither the outcome dimension nor the institutional competence dimension 
yields a definitive reason to favor or disfavor centralization—although the 
analysis may place a strong thumb on the scale one way or the other for those 
with strong priors on jurisprudential questions about tort law or the role of 
courts. 
A. Centralization’s Systemic Outcomes 
1.  The Upside of Centralization: Uniformity and Predictability 
First, centralization promotes uniformity. Uniformity has been the 
apparent motivating concern behind much of the Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area. On the few occasions where the justices have directly attempted to explain 
the shift in authority away from ground-level actors, concerns about uniformity 
and predictability have been at the forefront. In Gore, for instance, Justice 
Breyer (joined by Justices O’Connor and Souter) wrote separately to explain 
why the longstanding “presumption of validity” in jury verdicts was overcome 
 
 150. Even some law and economics scholars permit consideration of reprehensibility in limited 
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in the case and explained that creating law, rather than relying on a 
“decisionmaker’s caprice,” would help “assure the uniform general treatment of 
similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.”151  
The Gore guideposts themselves hint at this rationale. For instance, the 
third guidepost, the relationship between the punitive damages award and other 
types of penalties that could be imposed for similar conduct, considers concerns 
about uniformity across cases, and in practice, lower courts have generally 
applied the third guidepost by considering the punitive damages awards issued 
in similar cases within their jurisdiction. The majority in Cooper used a similar 
line of reasoning, offering that “de novo review tends to unify precedent” and 
“stabilize the law.”152 The scholarship has also picked up on this concern, and a 
number of prominent commentators have argued that a perceived absence of 
uniformity is the key problem that the Court’s jurisprudence does or should 
seek to solve.153 
This uniformity operates across different dimensions. At the broadest 
level, the Court’s constitutional limits supersede state legislation or common 
law developments that allow for different considerations to play different roles 
across the fifty states. In every jurisdiction in the country, both the Gore line of 
cases’ “substantive” rules about what is excessive and Philip Morris’s 
“procedural” rule limiting consideration of third-party harms supplant disparate 
state law approaches.154 One level down the chain, the shift from trial judges to 
appellate judges with presumably broader cross-case perspectives is plainly 
intended to promote uniformity, although there is some evidence that the 
success of that effort has been mixed.155 And there is a widespread belief, 
obviously at play in the Court’s decision in Oberg and Exxon Shipping, that jury 
decisions create greater variability than judge-made decisions—and, in 
particular, that there is a greater tendency for juries to issue “outlier” awards.156  
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This last dimension has drawn the most attention, especially from 
empiricists.157 As Professors Theodore Eisenburg and Michael Heise 
summarized, “After decades of dispute, it is now generally understood that the 
bulk of punitive damages awards have been reasonably sober, modest in size, 
and relatively stable over time, though some groups continue to question that 
reality.”158 And notably, in Exxon Shipping, the Court expressly disclaimed 
reliance on some prominent scholarship that had been funded in part by Exxon 
itself.159 Although there are grounds for questioning the extent to which jury 
awards reduce uniformity, for present purposes, we can assume that a shift to 
judges promotes uniformity as the Court appears to believe. 
So the question becomes: why is uniformity important in the context of 
punitive damages? Uniformity might be good in and of itself—a sense that 
similar cases will be treated similarly is, after all, deeply rooted in notions of 
fairness. There is something profoundly disconcerting about the possibility that 
the consequences of a tort depend on the luck of the draw. The principle that 
like cases should be treated alike runs deep as a fairness norm. It is worth noting 
that, even setting aside variation among decisionmakers, the principle is in 
tension with the heavy dose of variability inherent in the tort system, in which 
both damages questions—like what value to place on pain and suffering—and 
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substantive questions—like whether a course of action was negligent—are 
routinely left to juries and governed by common law.160 
Ultimately, the Court’s focus on uniformity is largely directed towards its 
more practical counterpart, predictability. “The real problem,” Justice Souter 
concluded in Exxon Shipping, “is the stark unpredictability of punitive 
awards.”161 In Exxon Shipping, the Court offered at least a surface-level 
explanation: “[A] penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so 
that even Justice Holmes’s ‘bad man’ can look ahead with some ability to know 
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another.”162 In other 
words, predictable punishments establish the incentives around which actors 
can plan their behavior, which is, implicitly, an important role for law.163 
It is worth stopping to emphasize an important point: in general, punitive 
damages may only be issued for intentional or reckless torts.164 Why, one might 
well ask, do we care if would-be-tortfeasors can plan out their intentional 
wrongdoing with a clear-eyed view of the consequences? One answer might be 
that, as a practical matter, we do not care whether tortfeasors behave recklessly 
or intentionally, or merely negligently; we just want them to behave in the 
economically optimal way, and punitive damages awards that are predictable 
could create the right incentives to encourage that optimal behavior. 
As a normative matter, whether this response makes sense depends on 
one’s view of the purposes of tort law generally. Law and economics scholars, 
for instance, have argued that the purpose of punitive damages—if any—is 
simply to require actors to internalize the costs of their wrongdoing, and 
punitive damages awards that are predictable may in some sense serve this 
function.165 Put differently, under the law and economics approach, punitive 
damages essentially “perfect the cost-internalization strategy expressed in the 
Hand Test.”166 The law and economics movement focuses, in particular, on 
what’s known as “optimal deterrence”—the idea is that the sanction for 
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98 N.C. L. REV. 315 (2020) 
342 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98 
wrongdoing should be set at a level that will promote the socially desirable level 
of a particular behavior.167 Some forms of well-calibrated punitive damages may 
have a role in doing just that, especially if there is reason to think a tort will be 
underdeterred without some form of supplemental penalty.168 And in a well-
functioning system, predictability may play an important role in allowing actors 
to assess whether their actions are worth the costs. 
From other perspectives within the tort scholarship, the role for 
predictability is far less clear. In particular, if tort law is understood to 
instantiate a system for dealing with wrongs,169 “optimal deterrence” is not the 
name of the game, and allowing would-be tortfeasors to precisely calibrate the 
likely costs of a violative course of action could well be counterproductive.170 If 
those in charge of a large corporation ran the math and decided that the 
predictable costs of intentionally or recklessly injuring an individual was 
economically rational, that would be all the more reason to impose a greater 
punitive damages award. As Professors Galanter and Luban put it: 
Only by imposing punitive damages of a different order from 
compensatory damages can a jury convey the message that a norm is 
categorical, that it demands compliance and not cost-benefit analysis. 
The point is to make the numbers on the balance sheet so ridiculous that 
the offender stops looking at the balance sheet.171 
To put the point somewhat differently, if one thinks that “total 
deterrence,” rather than “optimal deterrence,” is the right framework for 
intentional or reckless torts, then predictability undermines this aim.172 The 
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917, 925–26 (2010) (explaining that corrective justice theories understand tort law as being 
fundamentally about “loss,” whereas the civil redress theory stresses tort law’s role as a law of 
“wrongs”). Punitive damages are a considerably more natural outgrowth of redress theory. 
 170. See Markel, supra note 3, at 243. 
 171. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (1993). 
 172. Colby, supra note 2, at 471 (“[I]n an optimal deterrence regime, the actor ‘is entitled to harm 
the victim so long as he pays for the harm (with the expectation that this entitlement will induce him 
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whole point is to prevent people from making cost-benefit analyses that lead 
them to violate their duties towards others. 
As a jurisprudential matter, moreover, the focus on predictability is 
somewhat baffling, except as a post-hoc justification for reducing large awards. 
The Court’s substantive rules are a grab bag of limitations, drawn from 
divergent theories of punitive damages,173 but one thing that does seem clear is 
that the Court has not fully adopted the type of deterrent approach adopted by 
the law and economics movement.174 For instance, the first and “perhaps the 
most important”175 Gore guidepost—reprehensibility—depends on factors like 
the defendant’s mindset, which has little to do with the overall optimality of a 
particular course of action. And in Cooper, before deciding that appellate courts 
are better suited than trial judges to assess which awards are too large, the Court 
engaged in a strikingly direct discussion of the scholarly literature before 
squarely rejecting the idea that optimal deterrence was the relevant 
consideration.176 Indeed, many commentators have argued that the Court has 
 
to take optimal care),’ whereas in a complete deterrence regime, the actor ‘is not entitled to harm the 
victim even if [he] is willing to pay for that harm.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth 
W. Simmons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 273, 273 (1996))). 
 173. For instance, within the Gore guideposts, the relationship to other penalties (guidepost three) 
and the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (guidepost two) make sense within a framework 
focused on deterring and regulating conduct in a law and economics sense, whereas the first is basically 
anathema to that approach. See Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanada, The Foggy Road for Evaluating 
Punitive Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
441, 442 (2004). 
 174. See Rustad, supra note 1, at 462 (describing the Court’s “microanalysis of punitive damages” 
as “judicial miniaturism” and observing that the Court’s focus on individual retribution is evocative of 
a “punitive damages puppeteer” akin to the puppeteer in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave). While I share in 
some of the spirit of Professor Rustad’s work, the thrust of his argument is that the Court is myopically 
focused on the retributive focus of punitive damages at the expense of other purposes, like public 
deterrence. I am doubtful that the Court’s jurisprudence is sufficiently coherently theorized to even be 
characterized as myopic—while there can be no doubt that the Court has not adopted a law and 
economics approach full bore, its focus on predictability and the relationship between actual damages 
and punitive damages are certainly evocative of that approach, and it seems clear that the Court is 
attracted to it at a policy matter. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 
438 (2001). Moreover, in my view—which I intend to expound in future work—even a notion of tort 
law and punitive damages focused on retribution and redress can encompass some level of publicly 
oriented deterrence. Individual plaintiffs who go through the difficulty of litigation and uncover 
intentional abuses of power have a real, personal interest in feeling like the outcome of the litigation 
will not simply be for the wrongdoing to be “costed out,” leaving the guilty defendant in a position 
where from his or her perspective it may make sense to continue with the wrongdoing. 
 175. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). 
 176. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439–40. After expressly engaging with Professors Polinksy and Shavell’s 
article and a Judge Calibresi opinion espousing a similar approach, the Court explained that “deterrence 
is not the only purpose served by punitive damages.” Id. at 438–39. Even with respect to deterrence, 
the Court explained that “it is not at all obvious” that this purpose can be served only by an “optimal 
deterrence” approach. Id. at 439. The Court went on to explain that “[c]itizens and legislators may 
rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in economic efficiency in order to deter what 
they consider morally offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct; efficiency is 
just one consideration among many.” Id. 
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gone too far in prioritizing the “punitive,” revenge-oriented aspect of the 
Court’s jurisprudence at the expense of deterrence interests.177 
None of this is to say that predictability and uniformity are irrelevant. It 
seems clear that there is some basic virtue at stake in the idea that like cases 
should be treated alike, and centralization undoubtedly promotes that to at least 
some extent—although in this context, it notably does so only by reducing large 
awards. At a broad level, however, the question is whether these values are 
sufficiently great to overcome the other implications of increased 
centralization—including the values that are promoted by the absence of 
predictability and uniformity. 
2.  The Downsides of Centralization: Loss of Variation and Particularity 
The flipside of uniformity is variation—and the concomitant value of 
particularity. Equally obvious, the practical consequence of highly variable 
punitive damages awards is a decrease in predictability. 
This takes at least two forms. First, and more obviously, is the form of 
variability that arises because different decisionmakers (juries or judges at 
different levels or jurisdictions) are inclined to treat the same case differently. 
This is the downside of the standard fairness principle described above. This 
type of variation may be the result of mere chance—if, for instance, judicial 
decisions vary based on what the judge had for breakfast.178 In that sort of 
circumstance, it is difficult to argue for variation on its own terms (except to 
the extent that the resultant lack of predictability may serve a deterrent function 
as discussed above). Two different juries may produce different punitive 
damages awards—and as noted above, there is some indication that juries 
ultimately issue punitive damages awards with a higher overall variance.179 
But an analogous type of variation can also have important, and 
underrecognized, upsides. In particular, differences across jurisdictions or 
across decisionmakers are not necessarily bad things. Variation across states, for 
instance, allows states to serve their long-acknowledged role as “laboratories of 
democracies.”180 As it currently stands, the Court’s excessiveness jurisprudence 
would seem to prohibit a wide range of possible legislative approaches 
authorizing especially high punitive damages awards for certain kinds of 
 
 177. See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 1, at 462; Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, supra note 
2, at 363; see also Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation, supra note 1, at 27 (“By elevating a single 
punitive damages goal—that of retributive punishment—the Court sets the stage for a clash between 
state courts and legislatures that might be inspired to define their legitimate state interests in punitive 
damages differently.”). 
 178. This idea is widely, but probably apocryphally, attributed to Jerome Frank. See Brian Leiter, 
American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY AND LEGAL THEORY (M. 
Golding & W. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
 179. See Eisenberg et al., Juries, supra note 157, at 617. 
 180. See Klass, supra note 154, at 1576. 
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egregious misconduct, perhaps upon specific findings, and so it would be 
difficult to tell what type of policy impact such rules have. 
More broadly, different localities have different interests they may seek to 
vindicate with punitive damages. As Professor Rustad put it, “Punitive damages 
vindicate different interests in a state with a large agricultural sector than in one 
where software licensing, high technology, or Internet businesses drive the state 
economy.”181 But the point applies more narrowly: even setting aside 
differences in state laws, variations in awards by juries in different communities 
within a state may reflect different practical interests and moral intuitions 
across those communities. If a defendant has interactions in multiple 
communities, it is not clear from a normative perspective why they should not 
be, to at least some extent, accountable to the norms of those communities. And 
it is even less clear that a centralized decisionmaking body in Washington, D.C., 
has much to add to that judgment. More straightforwardly, variability at the 
jurisdictional level gives people more options, to the extent they can choose 
where to do business or live. 
Second, variability may result not from different decisionmakers but from 
different underlying circumstances in the case. A rich form of particularity 
requires room for variation. In short, cases that seem similar from ten thousand 
feet can be, on the ground, quite different. Indeed, the very example that the 
Supreme Court invoked as “anecdotal evidence” that variation is a problem 
illustrates the point.182 In Exxon Shipping, the Court relayed the following about 
Gore: 
One of our own leading cases on punitive damages, with a $4 million 
verdict by an Alabama jury, noted that a second Alabama case with 
strikingly similar facts produced “a comparable amount of compensatory 
damages” but “no punitive damages at all.” As the Supreme Court of 
Alabama candidly explained, “the disparity between the two jury verdicts 
. . . [w]as a reflection of the inherent uncertainty of the trial process.”183 
But even a surface review of the two cases the Court cites reveals a critical 
difference: in only one of the cases did the plaintiffs adduce evidence that the 
misconduct was intentional—an absolutely critical question in assessing the 
appropriateness or amount of punitive damages. The “inherent uncertainty of 
the trial process” that the Alabama court referred to is not a story about 
irrational juries—it’s a story about the fact that not every civil case will uncover 
equivalent evidence of wrongdoing.184 Recall that in State Farm, an expert 
 
 181. Rustad, supra note 1, at 523. 
 182. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 500–01 (2007). 
 183. Id. (alteration in original) (omission in original) (first quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 
517 U.S. 559, 525 n.8 (1996); and then quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626 
(Al. 1994) (per curiam)). 
 184. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 626 (Al. 1994) (per curiam). 
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testified that evidence of the insurance company’s intentional, nationwide 
scheme would be discovered in approximately one out of fifty thousand cases.185 
Cases, of course, can be different in ways that are subtler than that. When 
it comes to evaluating each case in its full richness, the actors closest to the 
ground—juries and trial judges—have a dramatic advantage. As the dissent in 
Cooper stressed, the Court has itself acknowledged that “[t]rial judges have the 
unique opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom context, 
. . . while appellate judges see only the cold paper record.”186 
This is especially so when questions turn on credibility, which tend to be 
of particular importance in questions of intent or motive—issues that are crucial 
to the assessment of punitive damages. But even beyond credibility 
determinations—no matter how strong an appellate judge’s grip on the record 
or how good her clerk—hours spent with a binder of transcripts cannot possibly 
bring a case alive with the richness of being present at an actual trial.187 The 
appellate court “is more removed from the vagaries and sympathies that arise 
from the trial process.”188 And appellate courts, most especially the Supreme 
Court, may well be tempted to establish broadly applicable rules even when 
adjudicating particularized disputes.189 In its ideal form, the common law 
system, coupled with appellate review, leads to the emergence of responsive, 
fact-specific rules that come about from the proper resolution of particularized 
cases. But on the margins, decisions made with an eye towards establishing the 
correct rule for future cases to follow may shortchange the particular facts of a 
case that caused a jury or trial judge to issue a particularly high award. Writing 
a useful and generalizable opinion, in other words, may come at the expense of 
particularity, even if only in subtle ways. 
More broadly, particularity is a deeply embedded norm in most 
conceptions of tort law, which is replete with rules like the eggshell skull rule 
and overwhelmingly fact-sensitive standards that govern everything from 
proximate cause to reasonableness. Under the relational theory of tort law, 
where the dignity of the injured is of particular concern, this makes sense. 
Arguably, punitive damages play a meaningfully different role than these other 
fact-sensitive tort questions. In Cooper, for instance, the Court concluded that 
 
 185. Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408, 415 (2003). 
 186. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 445 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 187. See generally, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation 
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 54 (2018) (“Each individual dispute, in turn, can be addressed 
with specific care and concern by the judge and jury who evaluate it. Broad principles structure the 
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(2006). 
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de novo appellate review of punitive damages is acceptable under the Seventh 
Amendment because the appropriate sanction is more of a moral question than 
a factual one.190 But particularization seems just as important in evaluating the 
totality of a defendant’s actions as in deciding more obviously factual questions 
about the sequence of events or the defendant’s intention, to the extent that 
those concepts can be separated at all in practice.191 In making that evaluation, 
the advantage in institutional competency surely belongs to the entities closest 
to the ground. 
B. Institutional Competence and Moral Expertise 
1.  Legal Perspective vs. Community Norms 
Uniformity, of course, is not the same as “getting it right.” And so even if 
uniformity may have virtue in any legal context, another corresponding 
drawback is that a uniform approach can be uniformly wrong. Centralization 
promotes the implementation of a single, unified vision. In some sense, what 
the Supreme Court has done over the last few decades is implement its vision 
of punitive damages and create a more centralized structure for implementing 
that vision. And the Court has been largely successful in that effort.192 Whether 
that vision is a desirable one as a substantive matter depends upon one’s policy 
preferences and, perhaps, on empirical questions beyond the scope of this paper. 
From a more systemic perspective, however, the more important question is 
whether there is reason to think that the Court is so well-suited to addressing 
the normative issues at stake in punitive damages that its vision should supplant 
those of other decisionmakers. 
In other words, to what extent do judges, and especially the Court, have a 
claim to “moral expertise” that suggests that their vision of the purposes and 
limits of punitive damages should win? This is a difficult question, one that goes 
to the heart of the question of what the role of the judiciary is. There is not a 
definitive answer to these broad questions, but it is worth taking a serious look 
at the threads most relevant to the context at hand. 
 
 190. See Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do?, supra note 17, at 164–65, 178 (arguing persuasively 
that the historical understanding on which the Court based this line of argument was entirely 
incorrect). 
 191. See Jill Wieber Lens, Punishing for the Injury: Tort Law’s Influence on Defining the Constitutional 
Limitations on Punitive Damage Awards, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 595, 621–22 (2011) [hereinafter Lens, 
Punishing for the Injury] (arguing that the Court’s focus on consistency is inconsistent with the private 
tort law conception that the Court has seemed to adopt in other respects). 
 192. See, e.g., N. William Hines, Marching to a Different Drummer: Are Lower Courts Faithfully 
Implementing the Evolving Due Process Guideposts To Catch and Correct Excessive Punitive Damage Award?, 
62 CATH. U. L. REV. 371, 401–02 (reviewing five hundred cases and concluding that there is some 
variation in how lower courts interpret the Gore guideposts in particular circumstances; on the whole, 
lower courts carry out the spirit of the guideposts with little resistance). 
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As an initial matter, as compared to state courts, federal courts have a 
unique institutional perspective with respect to issues that are national in scope 
or effect.193 State courts, by contrast, are closer to the issues that affect their 
states’ populations. The examples adduced by Professor Rustad put the point 
in sharp focus: 
A jury in Alabama, for example, awarded punitive damages in a case 
where a large agribusiness firm systematically cheated hundreds of 
chicken farmers by underweighing their chickens. Arizona, which has a 
large health-oriented population, imposes punitive damages by statute 
for willful misconduct in health spa contracts. California places a high 
value on the confidentiality of medical information, and provides 
punitive damages for unlawful disclosure by providers. California, as the 
center of the U.S. entertainment industry, also imposes punitive 
damages for the unauthorized commercial use of a deceased personality’s 
name, voice, or likeness. California uses the sanction of punitive damages 
to protect its considerable fine art holdings from being altered or 
destroyed, and finally, the remedy of punitive damages for rent 
skimming protects the large numbers of new immigrants to California.194 
A less-local court system would surely be less likely to appreciate the 
particular repugnance with which local juries might view these sorts of industry-
specific harms. More generally, even setting aside discrete issues along these 
lines, state courts may be more focused on issues that specifically affect the 
general public in their states, rather than focusing on a more systemic or abstract 
view of the law. For better or for worse, this phenomenon may be heightened 
by the extent to which state judges may be elected or appointed through more 
politically responsive processes. 
As compared to the population at large, federal courts—and the Supreme 
Court in particular—are different in at least two broad, salient categories.195 
 
 193. In this Article, I do not take up the quite difficult questions of how to deal with the 
extraterritorial impact that large punitive damages in one state may have, which has been discussed at 
length by others. Professor Sharkey, in particular, has argued that a major role the Court should play is 
in preventing states from attempting to legislate across state lines. See, e.g., Sharkey, Federal Incursions, 
supra note 25, at 455–56. For another nuanced discussion of this phenomenon, see Samuel Issacharoff 
& Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1420–28 (2006). 
 194. Rustad, supra note 1, at 523. 
 195. For a theory of when juries are and should be permitted to make normative judgments, see 
Gergen, supra note 160, at 417. Gergen argues that a key driver of when juries are permitted to make 
normative decisions is whether the issue implicates economic interests as opposed to physical personal 
interests. See id. at 413 (“While we are willing to let ordinary intuitive morality define obligation in 
the personal sphere, a different, more instrumental morality reigns in the economic sphere.”). Gergen 
does not take up the question of punitive damages, but it is worth noting that some courts that do 
consider seemingly economic injuries in punitive damages cases have suggested that economic injuries, 
and perhaps especially intentional ones, may be more akin to physical injuries in some cases. See, e.g., 
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Campbell III), 98 P.3d 409, 415 (Utah 2004) (“As the 
facts of this case make clear, misconduct which occurs in the insurance sector of the economic realm is 
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First is the professional dimension. It seems fair to assume that legal training 
and judicial experience make judges better at some forms of moral reasoning.196 
In particular, judges are better at making decisions that are more “prudential” 
or made with an eye towards how the case at hand fits in with the other cases.197 
Judges may encounter a wide array of different forms of wrongdoing, have a 
broad perspective on the penalties that are available or ordinarily imposed, and 
are trained to consider questions like what the precedential value of a decision 
(in a formal or informal sense) will have on other cases and the public at large.198 
Juries are often said to be more likely to make “emotional” decisions.199 This 
arguably cuts in both directions: to the extent that one role of the jury is to 
serve as the conscience of society, it is unclear why some level of emotion would 
be categorically inappropriate in assessing the gravity of harms. 
Judges are also systematically different from the public in other respects. 
The Supreme Court, in particular, is whiter, more male, older, and wealthier 
than the general population as are federal trial and appellate judges.200 State 
court judges are also disproportionately white and, especially, male,201 and it 
seems reasonable to assume that as lawyers, they also systematically differ from 
the populations they serve in regard to wealth, class, or educational dimensions. 
It is at least plausible that such demographic differences affect the way that the 
 
likely to cause injury more closely akin to physical assault or trauma than to mere economic loss. When 
an insurer callously betrays the insured’s expectation of peace of mind, as State Farm did to the 
Campbells, its conduct is substantially more reprehensible than, for example, the undisclosed 
repainting of an automobile which spawned the punitive damages award in Gore.”). 
 196. For a discussion of the unique moral perspective that lawyers have, see Joseph William Singer, 
Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 936–48 (2009). 
 197. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 160, 415–16. 
 198. For a systematic account of relevant differences between judges and juries, see David A. 
Logan, Juries, Judges, and the Politics of Tort Reform, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 903, 915–27 (2015). 
 199. See, e.g., Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 
179, 183 (1998) (“Judges are less susceptible to emotional factors, less likely to be unduly influenced by 
a defendant’s wealth, more experienced in imposing punishment, and more knowledgeable of the 
punishment imposed in other cases.”). 
 200. See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT 
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State Courts?, GAVEL GAP, https://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5HH-
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judges view punitive damages cases.202 As noted above, well-entrenched cultural 
narratives state that juries are predisposed to be biased against wealthy or 
corporate defendants.203 But saying that these decisionmakers treat different 
types of defendants differently tells us little about which approach is right. 
The Courts’ elite makeup may affect its sympathy for particular parties, 
and not necessarily always in a negative way. Assume, for instance, that 
Supreme Court justices—having generally graduated from Harvard or Yale 
Law Schools—are more likely to personally know executives in major, national 
corporations. It may well be that this gives them a more realistic understanding 
of the types of pressures corporate defendants and high-level employees 
experience at a human level—how easy, for instance, it can be for a perfectly 
normal person to focus on their own professional goals without taking a broader 
view of the impact on society, or how frustrating (and easy) it might be to have 
a corporate cost-cutting measure be construed by underlings as pressure to 
engage in more egregious misconduct. And they may indeed be less likely to 
villainize white-collar defendants simply because they work for banks and be 
sympathetic to the possibility that those in seemingly privileged places can face 
any number of outside anxieties and pressures. It would not necessarily be an 
injustice if a decisionmaker had a more realistic understanding of these sorts of 
issues. 
But the downside of this story is clear. If the norms of “elites” running 
major businesses are out of sync with how the rest of society thinks that business 
should work, that could just as easily be an argument that there is a greater need 
for mechanisms by which the less powerful can make that clear.204 And the 
flipside of the impulse to interpret a certain type of defendant generously is the 
tendency to overlook evidence that the defendant at hand was actually pretty 
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darn bad—a form of confirmation bias.205 Notably, judges do not seem to be 
friendlier than juries to defendants across the board. One study, for instance, 
indicated that judges are more likely to impose the death penalty than are 
juries.206 
2.  State Farm: A Case Study 
Take State Farm as a case study. The jury entered a punitive award of $145 
million; the trial judge felt bound by Gore to reduce the award to $25 million, 
but the Utah Supreme Court, reviewing the rather egregious trial record, 
concluded that $145 million was indeed an appropriate punishment.207 Yet a 
majority of the justices on the Supreme Court indicated that, at most, a punitive 
award amounting to a “single-digit multiplier” of the compensatory damages 
award ($1 million) was appropriate.208 On remand, the Supreme Court of Utah 
imposed an award at the top end of the permissible range, roughly $9 million,209 
ignoring the Court’s suggestion that a one-to-one ratio was “perhaps”210 the 
maximum allowable award when compensatory damages are substantial.211 
What should be made of the Court’s radical disagreement with the jury 
and state court judges about whether $145 million was wildly out of bounds of 
justice or, instead, entirely reasonable? One answer may lie in prudential 
concerns: the Court, for instance, was obviously concerned about the 
downstream effects of such a large award (especially if such awards became 
common) and its effect on other states, which seems like a concern uniquely 
within the competence of the federal courts in general and the Court in 
particular. Along the same lines, the Court may have viewed the lower courts 
as insufficiently sensitive to the harms that would befall other State Farm 
insureds if the company were to go out of business.212 Or perhaps the different 
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result was driven by a different level of immersion in the facts or different levels 
of deference towards the actors who were most deeply engaged with the facts. 
On the other side, perhaps the jury was, as the Court feared, punishing State 
Farm for being an “unsavory business,” rather than for its conduct.213 
Ultimately, however, it is hard to read the majority opinion without a 
sense that the Court simply did not view State Farm’s conduct as reprehensible 
to anywhere near the extent of the jury or the state judges. As the Utah Supreme 
Court put it on remand: 
In this instance, we find the blameworthiness of State Farm’s behavior 
toward the Campbells to be several degrees more offensive than the 
Supreme Court’s less than condemnatory view that State Farm’s 
behavior “merits no praise” . . . . As the facts of this case make clear, 
misconduct which occurs in the insurance sector of the economic realm 
is likely to cause injury more closely akin to physical assault or trauma 
than to mere economic loss. When an insurer callously betrays the 
insured’s expectation of peace of mind, as State Farm did to the 
Campbells, its conduct is substantially more reprehensible than, for 
example, the undisclosed repainting of an automobile which spawned the 
punitive damages award in Gore.214 
It seems that what the Court viewed as routine corporate delinquency, the 
jury and state courts viewed as a profoundly destructive and a foundational 
betrayal. And State Farm is hardly unique in this respect.215 Whether this is the 
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result of the higher court’s broader-minded judicial perspective, the 
contingencies of the particular personalities on the two courts at hand, or 
systematic selection criteria that make it likely that the justices on the Supreme 
Court are likely to have a series of life experiences quite different from most 
others, it puts in stark relief the extent to which disparate moral impressions 
can drive the limits placed on punitive awards.216 And yet it does not answer 
the question of whose judgment should govern. 
✦        ✦        ✦ 
Taking this all together, we are left in something of an equipoise: juries 
and judges have different reasonable claims to different relevant institutional 
competencies, and uniformity and predictability have advantages as well as real 
costs in this area. The different weight one may place on the different factors 
will likely turn primarily on one’s views of larger tort theory or on broad 
jurisprudential questions, such as the judiciary’s role in protecting wealthy 
defendants. For instance, to the extent punitive damages are a legitimate 
opportunity for communities to express moral outrage, either on behalf of 
society or on behalf of an individual victim, then all in all, centralization seems 
like the wrong direction—but to the extent that the imposition of damages is 
more of a technocratic exercise intended to promote an ideal level of behavior, 
it seems less so. And to the extent one views the judiciary, as opposed to jurors, 
as the best arbiters of fairness, whether for countermajoritarian or other reasons, 
centralization might seem like the best approach. But if the purpose of tort law 
is to allow for the vindication of violations of community norms, then the 
opposite result is reached. 
III.  VOICE: DECENTRALIZATION’S INDEPENDENT GOOD 
In sum, considering judicial centralization of punitive damages on the 
dimensions of jurisprudential aims and institutional competence sheds some 
light on its contours but does not provide an especially clear bottom line 
regarding whether it is desirable. And so, this Article turns next to a discussion 
of a third dimension: the relationship between this judicial centralization and 
democratic values like self-authorship and voice. On this dimension, I argue 
there is clear reason for concern about judicial centralization.217 
Understanding the stakes requires taking stock of how judicial 
centralization in the punitive damages domain connects with broader trends. 
Consolidation and federalization are increasingly the norm across a wide swath 
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of the law.218 Even within the traditionally diffuse realm of tort law, as 
Professors Golderberg and Zipursky have argued, the Supreme Court has 
effectively created a federal law of torts in a number of respects beyond punitive 
damages, controverting the spirit of Erie and the hornbook story that there is 
no federal common law.219 A parallel phenomenon could be said to describe 
much of modern life. Amazon—which reportedly controls nearly half of the 
online retail market in the United States220—now also owns Whole Foods. 
Google (or, rather, Alphabet) is undertaking an array of ambitious healthcare 
projects.221 After advocates’ intense efforts over years, it has recently come to 
light that AT&T adds four billion records of consumers’ phone calls per day to 
a surveillance program called Hemisphere, which is run in concert with the 
federal government.222 Not only is this fusion of power happening, in some 
instances it can be happening behind the scenes in ways that are extremely 
difficult for the public to find out about.223 
At the same time, less powerful individuals—along with the government 
itself—have been increasingly unable to exert control over the large entities that 
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seem to run the world.224 Some part of this phenomenon is surely attributable 
to broad economic and global trends.225 But it is also directly traceable to the 
Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence, which has affirmatively disabled the 
legislative branch’s efforts to protect the political process and made it harder 
for less affluent or powerful entities to affect corporate interests. By way of 
example, in Citizens United v. FEC,226 the Court held Congress’s efforts to 
restrain corporate influence in the political process unconstitutional.227 The 
predictable result has been a dramatic influx of corporate money into politics.228 
In Shelby County v. Holder,229 the Court held that an overwhelmingly popular 
provision of the Voting Rights Act, which prevented jurisdictions with 
particularly poor historical records of discrimination in elections from changing 
their election laws without going through a preclearance procedure, was likewise 
unconstitutional.230 The predictable outcome was that most of the covered 
jurisdictions have since enacted restrictive laws making it harder for minorities 
to vote.231 In the economic realm, the Court has put up significant roadblocks 
to other mechanisms that allow average individuals to band together in response 
to corporate power, such as unions232 and class actions.233 
We might hope that some combination of corporate responsibility, fear of 
negative publicity, genuine goodwill, and what legal restrictions remain would 
prevent egregious behavior—and in most instances, they probably do. But every 
year brings news of disasters caused by corporations that, it seems, should have 
done better. The examples in the Court’s own jurisprudence are telling: a 
known alcoholic is permitted to drive an oil supertanker through a fragile 
ecosystem234; tobacco executives engage in a decades-long misinformation 
campaign235; a major insurance company has a corporate-wide scheme to 
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defraud its customers.236 But those cases do not seem to be isolated. A 
pharmaceutical company, allegedly, intentionally hides the addictiveness of 
opioids.237 Facebook’s failure to address the use of its platform by foreign 
powers may or may not have swung the 2016 presidential election.238 
Additionally, what to major entities may seem like little more than sloppy 
business practices may seriously affect individual lives and communities, in both 
dramatic and subtle ways. Problems with Amazon’s bureaucratic “court” for 
assessing fake user reviews put small companies out of business.239 Facebook’s 
secret experimentation with users’ moods, which intentionally exposed some 
users to sadder content, affected millions.240 The extent of damage that 
genuinely malicious intent at high levels could wreak is enormous, and it is far 
from clear that such wrongdoing will be predictably uncovered. 
None of this is to say that larger or more centralized corporations are 
better or worse than smaller ones, or that this centralization is not preferable on 
a macro-level. The point is simply that even if this centralization is a good thing 
for the economy or society at large, a predictable consequence of it is a sense of 
increasing alienation from forces that govern even the most intimate parts of 
their lives. This is true even if such entities misbehave less than mom-and-pop 
shops (although as the above examples indicate, even if that’s true, the impact 
of any such misbehavior could be much greater). 
In light of all of this, there is good reason for the proverbial “little guy” to 
fear that possibilities for meaningful voice are on the decline. This effect is only 
compounded by heightened levels of socioeconomic stratification.241 Wealth 
concentration, in particular, is associated with “sociopolitical malaise” and 
democratic dysfunction because of the extent to which it gives disproportionate 
political voice to the affluent.242 And there is good reason to think that this 
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diminishment of voice is important for the welfare of both individuals and 
society.243 
What does this all have to do with punitive damages? In short, regardless 
of one’s take on these macro trends, if we care about individuals’ and 
communities’ ability to meaningfully engage with the world, then this is the 
wrong time to shift control over damage awards towards a narrower class of elite 
experts. And it is even more concerning for the force behind any such shift to 
be the least representative branch. 
Tort suits are in some sense a means for developing and articulating 
norms.244 In practice, punitive damages are a means of giving those norms teeth 
when violated by the powerful and affluent and, in particular, to push back 
against the implicit message that the wrongdoer is somehow more valuable than 
the victim or is entitled to treat the victim poorly.245 Both punitive awards and 
settlements negotiated in their shadow tend to target dominant parties.246 In 
many parts of the legal system, defendants can deflect blame by casting 
plaintiffs as overly litigious and the legal system as overly technical. That is 
much harder in the face of a dramatic punitive damages award, rendering 
punitive damages “perhaps the most important instrument in the legal 
repertoire for pronouncing moral disapproval of economically formidable 
offenders.”247 To be sure, the possibility that corporations get larger and more 
national in scope might well warrant corresponding national regulation in some 
domains. Any such shift, however, should be the product of our political 
process—such lawmaking is emphatically not the province of the courts. To say 
that because corporations have gotten so large that communities have difficulty 
engaging them, the judiciary should weaken the power of traditional forms of 
community voice seems to have things precisely backwards. 
The downsides of judicial centralization are most stark when it comes at 
the cost of jury control. In times past, juries were understood as a foundational 
aspect of democratic participation, and accorded significant control and respect; 
De Tocqueville, for instance, considered the jury “the most energetic means of 
making the people reign,” and recognized the role that the exercise of jury 
participation has on the jurors themselves.248 As others have recounted, the 
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jury’s standing—and its practical power—has dramatically diminished over 
time. But it remains the case that juries are uniquely positioned to deliver a 
message from the community, if we let them.249 As Professor Lahav has argued, 
to the extent that shifting authority away from juries “denies the validity of 
jurors’ rational disagreement with their fellow citizens who are also judges,” it 
infringes on the ideal of self-government.250 
Just this past term, in United States v. Haymond,251 the Court stressed the 
political role that juries play in enabling the people to maintain influence on the 
judicial function. Citing to the eighteenth-century diaries of John Adams and 
the nineteenth-century commentaries of Justice Story, the Court explained, 
“[j]ust as the right to vote sought to preserve the people’s authority over their 
government’s executive and legislative functions, the right to a jury trial sought 
to preserve the people’s authority over its judicial functions.”252 
Importantly, the Court stressed that a violation of the right to a jury trial 
did not only offend “the rights of the accused.”253 It also “divest[s] the ‘people 
at large’—the men and women who make up a jury of a defendant’s peers—of 
their constitutional authority to set the metes and bounds of judicially 
administered criminal punishments.”254 While that case involved criminal 
punishment, the broader principle that the tradition of juries protects not only 
accused defendants but also political power for “the people at large” has deep 
roots.255 
Judicial centralization sends a message that contrasts sharply to any such 
ideal self-government. It telegraphs that the people are not to be trusted to 
assess the behavior of the corporate forces that shape their lives. When judicial 
centralization takes the form of the Court substituting its view of defendant’s 
behavior for the jury’s, it sends another message, too: while the jury may have 
thought that the defendant’s behavior was egregious, the folks in Washington 
who understand how the world really works don’t agree. What is the lesson we 
expect those citizens to take about how “business is done” if they rise through 
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the ranks? Neither of these are messages that seem likely to spark a sense of 
engagement or social responsibility. In some ways, the messaging effect of 
judicial decentralization is only compounded by the fact that the Court often 
purports to be willing to defer to other actors, even while substituting its own 
judgment. The Court can never say that the jury award was “slightly askew,” or 
“suboptimal.” When its impression is that the verdict is wrong, to set the award 
aside, the Court must declare that it was “irrational and arbitrary,”256 regardless 
of how many members of the public and/or state judges decided the award was 
correct. 
✦        ✦        ✦ 
To be clear, to say that judicial centralization is cause for concern is not to 
say that there is no room for judicial review or for limitations on juries and 
states in the punitive damages realm. In some circumstances, requiring more 
detailed jury instructions regarding which factors may appropriately be 
considered, for instance, and interventions intended to reduce the arbitrary 
effect of psychological phenomena like “anchoring effects” that may 
subconsciously affect any decisionmaker may well be sound policy.257 And the 
increasingly national or even international nature of powerful actors, coupled 
with concerns about the extraterritorial effect of punitive damages, may be 
reasonable grounds for legislative responses, subject to ordinary democratic 
processes.258 But the attitude towards such interventions matters. If the 
animating principle is that citizens and lower-level decisionmakers are irrational 
or lack the perspective to decide just how bad corporate policies are, then efforts 
to constrain punitive damages will inevitably have the effect of compounding 
the alienation and powerlessness that seem so ever-prevalent. On the other 
hand, interventions that are directed towards properly instructing juries about 
the relevant considerations and protecting against undue extraterritorial effects 
seem entirely consistent with participatory norms.259 Ultimately, the point is 
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simply that there is a real cost—albeit a diffuse and difficult one to measure—
to our polity each time the ratchet is cranked, shifting this form of power over 
the powerful entities that affect modern life farther and farther from the people. 
CONCLUSION 
Judicial centralization—the defining through-line of modern punitive 
damages jurisprudence—has benefits and costs. The questions it implicates are 
fundamental, going to the heart of the relationship between democratic 
participation and the rule of law. Furthermore, the values on both sides of the 
ledger are real, and to some extent incommensurable.260 But the shift toward 
judicial centralization in the punitive damages realm does not exist in a vacuum: 
it is part and parcel of a broader trend towards the consolidation of power in 
the hands of an elite few. At bottom, the centralization of control over punitive 
damages represents an erosion of traditional checks on power, effected by the 
powerful themselves, and it diminishes the already-limited power of the little 
guy to participate in the creation and enforcement of public norms. Given the 
reduction of citizen voice across so many dimensions, that is a step in exactly 
the wrong direction. 
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